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IT’S A JUNGLE OUT THERE:
PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS ARISING FROM A
LIABILITY-FREE AMAZON.COM
Robert Sprague*
Through its website, Amazon.com retails its own products as well
as those of nearly three million third-party vendors through the Amazon
Marketplace. With few exceptions, courts have concluded Amazon.com
should not be considered a “seller” for purposes of strict products liability for products sold through its online Marketplace. In many cases,
this leaves consumers without recourse for injuries suffered due to defective products purchased through Amazon.com, since many of these
third-party vendors cannot be located. This article raises the question
of whether Amazon.com, as a matter of public policy, should be subject
to liability since it can better absorb the cost of compensating for injuries
resulting from defects. This article concludes that courts and legislatures need to recognize that traditional methods of selling products to
consumers have been upended by companies such as Amazon.com and
the laws need to be updated to reflect the new methods by which Amazon.com places potentially defective products into the stream of commerce.

* J.D. University of Denver College of Law; M.B.A. University of Southern California. Professor of Legal Studies in Business, University of Wyoming College of Business.

253

254

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:60

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction ................................................................................. 254
II. Amazon Online Marketplace....................................................... 255
III. Strict Products Liability Law and the “Innocent Seller” Defense
............................................................................................ .258
IV. Strict Products Liability Actions Against Amazon Based on ThirdParty Sales............................................................................ 262
A. Cases Finding Amazon Is Not a “Seller” .......................... 262
B. Cases Finding Amazon May Be a “Seller” ........................ 268
C. Immunity Under the Communications Decency Act ......... 274
V. Public Policy Considerations for Holding Amazon Strictly Liable as
a “Seller” .............................................................................. 276
VI. Conclusion ................................................................................ 279
I. INTRODUCTION
Retail giant Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon) now accounts for roughly
half of all online retail sales,1 offering over 100 million items for sale.2
It is inevitable that as Amazon places millions of products into the stream
of commerce, some of those products are defective, causing personal injury and property damage.3 Unlike traditional sellers, Amazon now sells
a majority of its products through third party vendors taking advantage
of Amazon’s web-based marketplace platform. As a result, Amazon
claims that it is not the actual “seller” of a majority of products sold
through its site, asserting, that it is not subject to liability when those
products prove to be defective. This article first, in Part II, provides an
overview of Amazon’s role as a U.S. retailer, with particular emphasis
on its online “marketplace” in which products are sold on Amazon’s
website by Amazon-approved third-party sellers. In Part III, this article
reviews the public policy arguments behind the evolution of strict products liability, with a special emphasis on how some states have carved
1. MATT STOLLER, GOLIATH: THE 100-YEAR WAR BETWEEN MONOPOLY POWER AND
DEMOCRACY 444 (2019). Total U.S. online retail sales as a percentage of total U.S. retail sales
are projected to be around twelve percent in 2020. See, e.g., J. CLEMENT, E-COMMERCE
SHARE OF TOTAL RETAIL SALES IN UNITED STATES FROM 2013 TO 2021, (Statista, 2019),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/379112/e-commerce-share-of-retail-sales-in-us/.
2. See 2018 Annual Report, AMAZON (2019), https://ir.aboutamazon.com/files/doc_financials/annual/2018-Annual-Report.pdf [hereinafter Amazon 2018 Annual Report] (stating
that over 100 million items alone are eligible for free shipping through the Prime membership
program).
3. See infra Appendix (summarizing nineteen recent products liability court decisions,
with associated claims, from sixteen lawsuits naming Amazon as a defendant); see also Alexandra Berzon, Hoverboards Test Amazon’s Liability in Product Safety—Cases Challenge Idea
that the Tech Giant Is a Mere Platform to Connect Buyers and Sellers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6,
2019, at A1 (stating that Amazon has faced seventeen lawsuits over defective hoverboards
alone, about half of which are still active).

2020] PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: A LIABILITY-FREE AMAZON.COM

255

out exceptions for “innocent” sellers who merely pass along products
within the chain of distribution from manufacturer to consumer. Part IV
examines recent court rulings addressing Amazon’s principal defense to
strict products liability when the product was sold on Amazon’s website
by an Amazon third-party seller—that Amazon is not entitled to any “innocent seller” exceptions because it is not even a “seller” subject to any
strict products liability laws.4 Part IV also reviews courts’ application
of Amazon’s immunity under the Communications Decency Act vis-àvis product liability claims. Part V provides an analysis of whether, for
public policy purposes, Amazon should be considered a “seller” under
strict products liability laws for third-party sale.
II. AMAZON ONLINE MARKETPLACE
In the past twenty years, Amazon has undergone a significant transformation. In 1999, ninety-seven percent of the company’s merchandise
sales were its own first-party sales.5 In 2018, fifty-eight percent of Amazon’s physical gross merchandise sales were through third-party sales
on its website.6 This reportedly represented $200 billion in worldwide
sales by 3 million active sellers.7 This growth in third-party sales was
no accident. According to Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos, it resulted from
providing the sellers with “the very best” selling tools, fulfillment services, and access to Amazon’s Prime membership program.8 In fact,
according to a report by the Wall Street Journal:
Amazon doesn’t make it easy for customers to see that many products aren’t sold by the company. Many third-party items the Journal
examined were listed as Amazon Prime eligible and sold through the
Fulfillment by Amazon program, which generally ships items from

4. Alternative claims plaintiffs have sought against Amazon related to allegedly defective products, such as negligence and breach of warranty, are not addressed in this article. See
infra Appendix (summarizing recent strict products liability claims actions against Amazon
and associated claims).
5. See Amazon 2018 Annual Report, supra note 2 (Jeffrey P. Bezos Letter to Shareholders); see also Daniel Keyes, Jeff Bezos Says Third Parties Are Besting Amazon—Here’s
Why That’s Good for the Firm, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/jeff-bezos-notes-third-party-sellers-are-besting-amazon-2019-4.
6. Keyes, supra note 5.
7. Juozas Kaziukėnas, Marketplaces Year in Review 2019, MARKETPLACE PULSE (Dec.
16, 2019), https://www.marketplacepulse.com/articles/marketplaces-year-in-review-2019.
8. See Amazon 2018 Annual Report, supra note 2 (Jeffrey P. Bezos Letter to Shareholders); see also Edward J. Janger & Aaron D. Twerski, The Heavy Hand of Amazon: A
Seller Not a Neutral Platform 10–13 (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper No.
612, 2019), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3467059 (describing how Amazon manages third-party
sellers and sales).
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Amazon warehouses in Amazon-branded boxes. The actual seller’s
name appeared only in small print on the listing page.9

The growth of Amazon’s sales have had negative societal impacts,
from reports of high rates of worker injuries at Amazon’s fulfillment
centers,10 to fatal traffic accidents involving drivers delivering Amazon
packages,11 to, particularly relating to third-party sellers, increasing sales
of counterfeit and unsafe goods.12 In a recent investigation, the Wall
9. Alexandra Berzon et al., Amazon Has Ceded Control of Its Site—The Result: Thousands of Banned, Unsafe or Mislabeled Products, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 2019, at B1.
10. See, e.g., Find Out What Injuries Are Like at the Amazon Warehouse that Handled
Your Packages, REVEAL (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.revealnews.org/article/find-out-whatinjuries-are-like-at-the-amazon-warehouse-that-handled-your-packages/; Letter from Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Senator, Edward J. Markey, U.S. Senator, & Joseph P. Kennedy, III, Member of Congress, to Jeffrey Bezos, CEO, Amazon.com (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2019.12.20%20Letter%20to%20Mr.%20Bezos%20on%20Fa
ll%20River%20Facility.pdf. See also Josh Dzieza, A Seventh Amazon Employee Dies of
COVID-19 as the Company Refuses to Say How Many Are Sick, VERGE (May 14, 2020, 8:20
PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/5/14/21259474/amazon-warehouse-worker-death-indiana (noting that Amazon employees have criticized the company for failing to notify employees when their colleagues were diagnosed with the virus); Press Release, Massachusetts
Attorney General, AG Healey Leads Multistate Group Urging Amazon and Whole Foods to
Strengthen Worker Protections During COVID-19 Pandemic (May 12, 2020),
https://www.mass.gov/news/ag-healey-leads-multistate-group-urging-amazon-and-wholefoods-to-strengthen-worker.
11. See, e.g., Patricia Callahan, Amazon Pushes Fast Shipping but Avoids Responsibility
for the Human Cost, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/05/us/amazon-delivery-drivers-accidents.html; Kate Cox, Driver Training Was Reportedly Too Much of “a Bottleneck” for Amazon, ARSTECHNICA (Dec. 26, 2019,
9:55 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/12/driver-training-was-reportedly-toomuch-of-a-bottleneck-for-amazon/ (reporting internal Amazon documents indicated the company planned to implement driver safety training courses but scrapped them in order to get
drivers up and running faster); Caroline O’Donovan & Ken Bensinger, Amazon’s Next-Day
Delivery Has Brought Chaos and Carnage to America’s Streets—But the World’s Biggest
Retailer Has a System to Escape the Blame, BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 6, 2019),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/carolineodonovan/amazon-next-day-delivery-deaths.
In perhaps the ultimate irony, it is reported that in 2013 Amazon’s first chief financial officer,
while riding her bike, was struck and killed by a delivery van carrying Amazon packages. See
Hayley Peterson, Amazon Executive Was Killed After Colliding with a Van Delivering the
Company’s Packages, Report Reveals, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 23, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/amazons-joy-covey-killed-company-delivery-van-report-2019-12.
12. See, e.g., Kaity Y. Emerson, From Amazon’s Domination of E-Commerce to Its
Foray into Patent Litigation: Will Amazon Succeed as “The District of Amazon Federal
Court”?, 21 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 71, 85 (2019) (stating that Amazon has a pervasive counterfeit
problem); Eugene Kim, Amazon Added a First-Ever Warning About Counterfeit Products to
Its Earnings Report, CNBC (Feb. 4, 2019, 3:43 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/04/amazon-10k-warns-investors-about-counterfeit-problem-for-first-time.html (reporting that for
the first time Amazon listed counterfeit goods as a risk factor in a recent earnings report;
reporting also that the problem could get worse as Amazon shifts more of its sales to thirdparty sellers); Timothy Puko & Alex Leary, U.S. Considers Censuring Amazon Sites, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 7, 2019, at B3 (reporting that the Trump administration is considering adding
some of Amazon’s overseas operations to a list of global marketplaces known for counterfeit
goods).
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Street Journal found 4,152 items for sale on Amazon’s website that have
been declared unsafe by federal agencies, are deceptively labeled, or are
banned by federal regulators.13 After Amazon was informed of the products identified by the Wall Street Journal, nearly half remained on its
website.14 In addition, a wave of Chinese merchants have joined Amazon’s millions of third-party sellers worldwide.15 A new product listing
is reportedly uploaded to Amazon from China every 1/50th of a second,
many of them mislabeled, defective, or counterfeit.16 Some third-party
sellers are literally selling garbage on the Amazon website.17 The Wall
Street Journal’s conclusion is that Amazon either has lost control of its
massive platforms or declines to control them.18 At the same time, for
many third-party sellers, Amazon’s actions can have tremendous impacts on their sales.19 For many of these sellers, Amazon controls the
prices they can charge, forbids sales to middlemen, and compels the
sellers to buy ads on Amazon’s website.20
13. See Berzon et al., supra note 9 (noting further that among the products identified, at
least 2,000 were for toys and medications that lacked warnings about health risks to children).
14. See id. (noting further that when Amazon did take down listings for banned items,
the same products sometimes reappeared under new accounts).
15. See Jon Emont, Amazon’s China Push Puts Consumers at Risk—Chinese Factories
Wooed by Retailer Are Big Source of Problem Listings, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2019, at A1.
16. See id.; see also Ari Levy, Amazon’s Chinese Counterfeit Problem Is Getting Worse,
CNBC (July 8, 2016, 5:03 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/08/amazons-chinese-counterfeit-problem-is-getting-worse.html; Casey Hopkins, Amazon Is Complicit with Counterfeiting
(Updated),
ELEVATIONLAB
(Mar.
1,
2018),
https://www.elevationlab.com/blogs/news/amazon-is-complicit-with-counterfeit-sellers# (“[W]hen Chinese
counterfeiters tool up and make copies of your product, send that inventory to Amazon, then
overtake the real product’s buy box by auto-lowering the price—it’s a real problem. Customers are unknowingly buying crap versions of the product, while both Amazon and the scammers are profiting, and the reputation you’ve built goes down the toilet.”).
17. See Khadeeja Safdar et al., Consumers Might Be Buying Trash on Amazon—Literally—Dumpster Divers Say They Sell Discards on the Site. We Did, Too, WALL ST. J., Dec.
18, 2019, at A1; see also Joshua Rosario, Online Order of Diapers Arrives at Jersey City
Home—But They Were Already Soiled, JERSEY J. (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.nj.com/hudson/2020/01/online-order-of-diapers-arrives-at-jersey-city-home-but-they-were-alreadysoiled.html (reporting that one of two boxes of diapers purchased from Amazon contained
soiled diapers).
18. See Berzon et al., supra note 9.
19. See Karen Weise, Prime Power: How Amazon Squeezes the Businesses Behind Its
Store, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/19/technology/amazon-sellers.html
(last visited Jan. 10, 2020).
20. See id. In fact, Amazon determines whether an offering by a third party is eligible to
be displayed as a featured offer, sometimes will credit customers’ accounts when it believes
a third-party seller’s price is too high, and suspend third-party sellers without providing detailed reasons for the suspension. See Online Platforms and Mkt. Power, Part 2: Innovation
and Entrepreneurship, Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Com., and Admin. Law of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 23, 25, 27–28 (2019) (Amazon Responses to Cicilline
Questions for the Record); see also Annie Palmer, Amazon Lifts FedEx Ground Delivery Ban
for Sellers, FedEx Shares Rise, CNBC (Jan. 14, 2020, 7:08 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/14/amazon-lifts-fedex-ground-delivery-ban-for-sellers.html
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Should Amazon, which serves as an integral part of the overall marketing and selling of goods, bear the cost of injuries resulting from defective products sold through its website?21 Or should it be immune from
liability because it merely passes along defective products from manufacturer to consumer?
III. STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW AND THE “INNOCENT SELLER”
DEFENSE
Products liability law is rooted in common law.22 In the 1916 case
of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company,23 the New York Court of Appeals extended a manufacturer’s liability for negligence to consumers
who did not have a direct relationship with the manufacturer. (Here,
MacPherson purchased his Buick from a dealer, not directly from
Buick.24) Writing for the majority, Justice Benjamin Cardozo concluded
that where a product is reasonably certain to pose a risk to others beyond
the purchaser, the manufacturer has a duty of care—independent of contract.25 Over the next fifty years, courts began imposing strict liability
against manufacturers based mainly on three public policy considerations outlined by William Prosser in The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer): (1) the law should protect consumers injured
by defective products who are helpless to protect themselves; (2) suppliers, by placing goods upon the market, represent to the public that the
goods are suitable and safe for use—“The supplier has invited and solicited the use; and when it leads to disaster, he should not be permitted to
avoid the responsibility by saying that he has made no contract with the
consumer”; and (3) it is much more efficient for any supplier in the

(reporting that in December 2019, Amazon had suspended third-party sellers’ access to
FedEx’s ground and home delivery services for Prime orders).
21. Cf. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171-72 (Cal. 1964) (explaining
the “integral” role that retailers play in “bear[ing] the cost of injuries resulting from defective
products”).
22. Frances E. Zollers et al., Looking Backward, Looking Forward: Reflections on
Twenty Years of Product Liability Reform, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1019, 1021 (2000).
23. 217 N.Y. 382, 384-85, 94–95 (1916) (affirming judgment in favor of purchaser of
automobile injured when wheel collapsed).
24. Id. at 384.
25. See id. at 389; see also William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1100 (1960) (“In 1916 there came the phenomenon of the improvident Scot who squandered his gold upon a Buick, and so left his name
forever imprinted upon the law of products liability. Cardozo, wielding a mighty axe, burst
over the ramparts, and buried the general rule [of nonliability to persons not in privity] under
the exception.”); Zollers et al., supra note 22, at 1021 (noting that MacPherson set the stage
for products liability law to develop).
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distribution chain to be “liable directly to the ultimate user.”26 As noted
by Zollers et al.:
The move to strict liability incorporates the faultless characteristic of
breach of warranty without all the baggage of contract law such as
privity and the ability to bargain away warranties. It simply holds a
manufacturer and any other distributor of the product strictly liable
if a product it either produced or sold contains a defect that causes
injury.27

Strict products liability was ultimately expressed in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, § 402A:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business
of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the
user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold.28

This rule applies even if: “(2) . . . (a) the seller has exercised all
possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user
or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.”29 Section 402A, which reflects products liability law in a majority of states,30 “eliminate[d] privity so that a
user or consumer, without having to establish negligence, could bring an
action against a manufacturer, as well as against any other member of a
distributive chain that had sold a product containing a manufacturing defect.”31
26. See Prosser, supra note 25, at 1122–24. Zollers et al. note that for a while, courts
applied warranty theories as a bridge between negligent and strict products liability. See
Zollers et al., supra note 22, at 1022. An additional public policy argument is that strict products liability will incentivize safe products. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno,
150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (“It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products having defects that are a menace to the public.”); Ryan
Bullard, Out-Teching Products Liability: Reviving Strict Products Liability in an Age of Amazon, 20 N.C. J. L. & TECH. ON. 181, 191–92 (2019).
27. Zollers et al., supra note 22, at 1022 (“It is irrelevant whether someone in breach of
contract negligently failed to fulfill his or her promises. The only relevant issue is whether the
promises were broken.”).
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: SPECIAL LIABILITY OF SELLER OF PRODUCT
FOR PHYSICAL HARM TO USER OR CONSUMER § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965) [hereinafter §
402A].
29. Id.
30. See Adam Feeney, Note, In Search of a Remedy: Do State Laws Exempting Sellers
from Strict Product Liability Adequately Protect Consumers Harmed by Defective ChineseManufactured Products?, 34 J. CORP. L. 567, 570 (2009).
31. Introduction to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PROD. LIAB., at 3 (AM. LAW INST.
1998).
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Echoing Prosser’s second public policy argument,32 since all parties
have participated in and profited from the product’s distribution, “they
should not be heard to complain if they are held responsible for defects
in the products they sell when the plaintiff has no means of recovery
from the manufacturer.”33 Holding these participants, including nonmanufacturer sellers, strictly liable promotes “the public policy that an
injured party not have to bear the cost of his injuries simply because the
product manufacturer is out of reach.”34 As such, this public policy argument is strongest when the product manufacture is bankrupt, cannot
be identified, or is not subject to the court’s jurisdiction or service of
process;35 and it is weakest when the plaintiff does have an adequate
remedy against the manufacturer.36
When Prosser argued that a “privity-less” strict liability regime is
more efficient,37 he was arguing from the consumer’s perspective—
eliminating the need to pursue multiple lawsuits until the manufacturer
was finally held liable for the damages caused by its defective product.38
But non-manufacturer sellers see an inefficiency—they must engage in
two lawsuits: the first to defend against the injured consumer; and (assuming the consumer prevails) a second action seeking indemnity from
the manufacturer.39 Stronger arguments against holding non-manufacturer sellers strictly liable are that they simply did not create the defect
in the product and they “are ill-equipped to defend a product which they
neither designed nor manufactured.”40 In particular, they “usually act
merely as conduits of the product between the manufacturer and the consumer.”41
By the end of the 1970s, a majority of states had adopted revisions
to their products liability statutes that limited the strict liability of non32. See supra text accompanying note 26.
33. Robert A. Sachs, Product Liability Reform and Seller Liability: A Proposal for
Change, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 1031, 1036 (2003).
34. Dunn v. Kanawha City. Bd. of Educ., 459 S.E.2d 151, 157 (W. Va. 1995); see also
Samuel Friedland Family Enters. v. Amoroso, 630 So. 2d 1067, 1068 (Fla. 1994) (“The underlying basis for the doctrine of strict liability is that those entities within a product’s distributive chain who profit from the sale or distribution of the product to the public, rather than an
innocent person injured by it, should bear the financial burden of even an undetectable product
defect.” (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)).
35. See Sachs, supra note 33, at 1037.
36. See id.
37. See supra text (third public policy argument) accompanying note 26.
38. See Prosser, supra note 25, at 1123–24.
39. See Feeney, supra note 30, at 571–72 (citing Frank J. Cavico, Jr., The Strict Tort
Liability of Retailers, Wholesalers, and Distributors of Defective Products, 12 NOVA. L. REV.
213, 229–30 (1987)).
40. Frank J. Cavico, Jr., The Strict Tort Liability of Retailers, Wholesalers, and Distributors of Defective Products, 12 NOVA. L. REV. 213, 227–28 (1987).
41. Id. at 227.
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manufacturer sellers.42 Frank Cavico categorizes the limitations into
four basic categories: Indemnification Statutes allow the plaintiff to recover against a non-manufacturer product seller on a strict liability theory, but then require the manufacturer to indemnify the seller;43 “Sealed
Container” Statutes generally hold a non-manufacturer seller not liable
if the product was sold in its original condition or package, no express
warranties were made, and the seller did not have knowledge that the
product was defective or unreasonably dangerous;44 Absolute Bar Statutes absolutely exempt non-manufacturer sellers from strict products liability;45 and Partial Bar Statutes generally exempt non-manufacturer
sellers from strict product liability if the manufacturer can be identified
and is within the court’s jurisdiction.46 Generally, these limitations to
liability will not apply if the seller knew or should have known of the

42. See id. at 237. These revisions were primarily based on a proposed Model Uniform
Products Liability Act. See id. at 233–37 (analyzing the Model Uniform Products Liability
Act); Feeney, supra note 30, at 572–73 (providing overview of the Model Uniform Products
Liability Act); see also Zollers et al., supra note 22, at 1023–32 (analyzing attempts to enact
a federal products liability act).
43. See Cavico, supra note 40, at 237 (citing e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN . § 12-684A
(1982)); see also 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 832.1 (West 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(g)
(West 2014).
44. See Cavico, supra note 40, at 238 (citing e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.340 (Supp.
1986)); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 7001 (West 1995).
45. See Cavico, supra note 40, at 238–39 (citing e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-21,181
(1985); see, e.g., S. D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-9-9 (1979) (unless the seller knew, or, in the
exercise of ordinary care, should have known, of the defective condition of the final product);
see also GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11.1 (West 1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(h).
46. See Cavico, supra note 40, at 239–40 (citing e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21402(1) (1986); see also Feeney, supra note 30, at 574 (discussing state statutes that hold nonmanufacturer sellers strictly liable where the court cannot obtain jurisdiction over the manufacturer or where the manufacturer is insolvent); see, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 544.41(Subd.
2)(3) (West 1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.040(2)(a) (West 1991); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-20-2-4 (West 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99B-2(a) (West 1996) (providing nonmanufacturing seller immunity from strict liability for sealed container unless manufacturer
is not subject to court’s jurisdiction); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.78(B)(2) (West 2001)
(providing non-manufacturing “supplier” subject to strict liability where, inter alia, manufacturer is insolvent or not subject to courts’ jurisdiction); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 82.003(a)(7) (West 2006) (providing non-manufacturing seller subject to strict liability
where, inter alia, manufacturer is insolvent or not subject to courts’ jurisdiction); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-7-31(b)(12)–(13) (West 2017); MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.762(2) (West 2019)
(providing dismissal of non-manufacturer seller where manufacturer is before court and from
whom total recovery may be had); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-9(c)(1) (West 1995) (providing
non-manufacturing seller can escape strict product liability by identifying manufacturer);
ALA. CODE § 6-5-521(d) (1979) (requiring plaintiff to dismiss non-manufacturing seller if
manufacturer can be identified and an action is commenced against it); Pierce v. Amazon.com
Serves., Inc., No. 4:19-CV-393-KOB, 2020 WL 374836, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 23, 2020) (applying ALA. CODE § 6-5-521(d)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1,
cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1998) (discussing application of innocent seller provisions).
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defect or if the seller somehow created the defect that was a substantial
cause of the incident that gave rise to the action.47
As the preceding review demonstrates, a number of states have enacted statutes that potentially immunize non-manufacturer sellers from
strict products liability where the seller merely passes the product along
the distribution chain from manufacturer to consumer. For the most part,
though, these statutes fail to clarify what qualifies as a “seller” under
strict products liability laws.
IV. STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS AGAINST AMAZON BASED
ON THIRD-PARTY SALES
In a series of products liability cases brought against Amazon,
which had facilitated the sale of an allegedly injurious defective product
by a third party, the key consideration of the courts was not whether
Amazon was an immunized seller, but whether Amazon should even
qualify as a “seller” of the product in question.48 The analysis of cases
reveals that courts have been inconsistent in settling this question.
A. Cases Finding Amazon Is Not a “Seller”
In McDonald v. LG Electronics USA, Inc.,49 the plaintiff alleged
injuries suffered due to defective rechargeable batteries.50 The batteries,
manufactured by LG Electronics, were sold and shipped by Safetymind,
an Amazon third-party seller.51 The district court pointed out that under
Maryland law, “[i]rrespective of whether the theory of recovery is breach
of warranty, negligence or strict liability, a plaintiff must show ‘three
product litigation basics’—defect, attribution of defect to seller, and a
47. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-684(A); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 7001(b);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.340; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 544.41(Subd. 3); MISS. CODE ANN. §
11-1-63(h); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99B-2(a); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-9(d); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2307.78(B); S. D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-9-9(a); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 82.003(a); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-31(b). See generally Sachs, supra note 33 (analyzing statutes immunizing non-manufacturer sellers from strict product liability); see also
infra Appendix (summarizing statutes immunizing non-manufacturer sellers from strict product liability).
48. As Amazon’s third-party sales volume exceeded fifty percent of total consumer sales,
so also did the products liability claims against Amazon begin. See Amazon 2018 Annual
Report, supra note 2 (reflecting third-party sales exceeding fifty percent of Amazon’s consumer sales beginning in 2015). See, e.g., Mavromati v. Spot, LLC, No. CV 14-03333 SJO
(Ex), 2016 WL 4820634, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2016) (dismissing products liability claim
against Amazon and other defendants due to plaintiff’s failure to raise a genuine issue whether
defect in product caused death; first apparent reported products liability claim against Amazon
related to a third-party sale).
49. 219 F. Supp. 3d 533 (D. Md. 2016).
50. See id. at 535.
51. See id.
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causal relationship between the defect and the injury.”52 The plaintiff
failed to establish the second element, according to the court, because
the plaintiff alleged LG Electronics and Safetymind, but not Amazon,
had placed the defective product in the stream of commerce.53 Finally,
the court dismissed the plaintiff’s breach of implied warranty claim, concluding Amazon was not a merchant under Maryland’s Uniform Commercial Code (UCC): “Here, Amazon’s role as the ‘platform’ for the
third-party sales does not qualify it as a merchant or a seller under Maryland’s UCC.”54
The notion of what constitutes a seller for purposes of products liability law was later emphasized by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
applying Maryland law. In Erie Insurance Company v. Amazon.com,
Inc.,55 a consumer purchased an LED headlamp on Amazon’s website,
though it was sold by Dream Light and fulfilled by Amazon.56 After the
purchaser gave the headlamp to a friend as a gift, the friend’s house
caught fire allegedly due to defective batteries in the headlamp.57 As
described by the court, Amazon’s involvement in the transaction consisted of receiving the headlamp from Dream Light, storing the headlamp in its warehouse, retrieving the headlamp from its warehouse, shipping the headlamp to the purchaser via UPS, collecting the purchase
price, and forwarding the purchase price to Dream Light, less a service
fee.58 Dream Light itself set the price for the headlamp and created the
content of the product’s description used on the Amazon site.59
The plaintiff argued that Amazon, through its fulfillment services
program, took so much control over the transaction that it effectively
became the seller and therefore became responsible under theories of
negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability in tort.60 The court
52. See id. at 541 (quoting Laing v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 949 A.2d 26, 39 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2008) (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 779 A.2d 362, 370 (Md.
2001))) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the McDonald court initially categorized
McDonald’s claim as for products liability, it focused primarily on counts of negligence and
breach of implied warranty. See id. at 541–42.
53. See id. at 542.
54. Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., COMM. LAW § 2-314(1) (1975) (defining a merchant as
“a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as
having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practice or goods involved in the transaction”)).
55. 925 F.3d 135 (4th Cir. 2019).
56. See id. at 138.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. Id. at 140. According to the plaintiff, “[t]he purchaser ordered from Amazon, using
Amazon’s website. The purchaser paid Amazon directly. Amazon packaged the product, in
Amazon’s warehouse, delivered it to the carrier, assumed the risk of credit card fraud, received
payment, collected Amazon’s fee, and presumably forwarded any remaining balance to
Dream Light. The purchaser never had direct contact—or, really, privity of any sort—with

264

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:60

rejected the plaintiff’s argument, stating it found “no indication that the
term ‘seller,’ as used in Maryland’s products liability law, should be understood in any manner other than its ordinary meaning[]”—a “seller”
sells goods, and a “sale” means passing title from the seller to the buyer
for a price.61 But the court adopted this interpretation of Maryland law
with very little persuasive precedent. It cited McDonald for the proposition that Amazon was not a seller,62 but the McDonald court noted that
it did so because the plaintiff’s complaint failed to list Amazon as a party
that had placed the allegedly defective product in the stream of commerce.63 The Erie court also cited a Pennsylvania Supreme Court holding that auctioneers are not “sellers” for purposes of § 402A;64 a Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals holding that Amazon was not liable as a seller
for copyright infringement of a pillowcase sold by a third-party seller on
Amazon’s website;65 and Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc.,66 a federal district court case holding Amazon was not a “seller” under Pennsylvania
law, a finding that was later vacated by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.67
Amazon was sued under Tennessee’s Products Liability Act after
the batteries in a hoverboard, purchased through Amazon and given as a
2015 Christmas present, caused a fire that consumed the plaintiff’s
house.68 Although the plaintiff purchased the hoverboard through
Dream Light. The contract was between him and Amazon, not between him and Dream
Light.”
61. Erie Ins. Co., 925 F.3d at 141 (citing MD. CODE ANN., COMM. LAW §§ 2-103(1)(d),
2-106); accord Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
(stating that, under New York Law, failure to take title to a product places an entity outside
the chain of distribution). But see Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738
(FLW) (LHG), 2018 WL 3546197, at *25-26 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018) (citing Laidlow v. Hariton
Machinery Co., Inc., 335 N.J. Super. 330, 337 (App. Div. 2000)) (stating that holding title is
not a requirement before strict liability will be imposed under New Jersey law); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 20(a) (“One sells a product when, in a commercial context, one transfers ownership thereto either for use or consumption or for resale
leading to ultimate use or consumption.” (emphasis added)).
62. See Erie Ins. Co., 925 F.3d at 141 (citing McDonald, 219 F. Supp. 3d at 541–42).
63. See McDonald, 219 F. Supp. 3d at 542 (finding also that Amazon’s role as a platform
provider did not qualify it as a merchant under Maryland’s UCC); see supra notes 52–54 and
accompanying text.
64. See Erie Ins. Co., 925 F.3d at 141 (citing Musser v. Vilsmeier Auction Co., 562 A.2d
279, 283 (Pa. 1989)).
65. See id. (citing Milo & Gabby LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 693 F. App’x 879, 886–88
(Fed. Cir. 2017)).
66. 295 F. Supp. 3d 496, 501 (M.D. Pa. 2017).
67. 930 F.3d 136 (3rd Cir. 2019), reh’g on banc granted, opinion vacated, 936 F.3d 182
(3rd Cir. 2019).
68. Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16–cv–03013, 2018 WL 2431628, at *1 (M.D.
Tenn. May 30, 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 930 F.3d 415, 421 (6th Cir. 2019) (noting
the parties did not dispute that the hoverboard’s lithium-ion battery pack caused the fire).
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Amazon’s website, Amazon contended that the actual seller was thirdparty seller W2M Trading (also known as W–Deals), located in China.69
The district court noted that Amazon did not make any statements or
representations about the hoverboard, develop the product detail page
content on its webpage, make any representations to the plaintiff about
the hoverboard before or at the time of purchase, or design or manufacture the hoverboard.70
According to the court, nearly all of Amazon’s hoverboard sales
were through third-party sellers, earning Amazon over $200 million between September 2015 through November 2015.71 In November 2015,
Amazon began investigating the safety of hoverboards after learning that
a hoverboard sold by W–Deals had burst into flames.72 By December
10, 2015, Amazon had reports of at least seventeen complaints of hoverboard fires or explosions in the United States alone from hoverboards
sold on Amazon’s website.73 On that date, Amazon decided to suspend
all international sales of hoverboards, and on December 12, sent “nonalarmist” emails to U.S. Amazon hoverboard purchasers stating, “There
have been news reports of safety issues involving products like the one
you purchased that contain rechargeable lithium-ion batteries.”74
Amazon argued it is not a “seller” under the Tennessee Products
Liability Act (“TPLA”)75 “because it did not hold title to the product, set
the price of the product, develop the product offer, or ship the product
directly to [the p]laintiff.”76 The TPLA immunizes sellers from liability
unless:
(1) The seller exercised substantial control over that aspect of the
design, testing, manufacture, packaging or labeling of the product that
caused the alleged harm for which recovery of damages is sought;
(2) Altered or modified the product, and the alteration or modification was a substantial factor in causing the harm for which recovery of
damages is sought;
(3) The seller gave an express warranty . . . ;
(4) The manufacturer or distributor of the product or part in question is not subject to service of process in this state and the long-arm
statutes of Tennessee do not serve as the basis for obtaining service of
process; or
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Fox, 2018 WL 2431628, at *4.
Id.
Id. at *4–5.
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-28-101 to 29-28-108 (1978).
Fox, 2018 WL 2431628, at *6.
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(5) The manufacturer has been judicially declared insolvent.77
The plaintiff sought to hold Amazon liable under exception (4)
above because it was undisputed that the manufacturer of the hoverboard
at issue was unknown.78
The district court therefore turned to whether Amazon qualified as
a “seller” under the TPLA, which states that a “ ‘ [s]eller’ includes a retailer, wholesaler, or distributor, and means any individual or entity engaged in the business of selling a product, whether such sale is for resale,
or for use or consumption.”79 Amazon argued it was not a “seller” under
the TPLA “because it did not hold title to the product, set the price of the
product, develop the product offer, or ship the product directly to the
plaintiff.”80 Alternatively, the plaintiff argued Amazon was “a ‘coseller’ of the hoverboard, along with W2M Trading, and it act[ed] as a
‘retailer’ or ‘distributor’ of the product because it exercised complete
control over the sale and kept the entire purchase price paid by [the plaintiff].”81
Since “retailer” and “distributor” are not defined by the TPLA, the
court looked to both the Merriam–Webster and Black’s Law dictionaries,
concluding Amazon was a service provider, not a “seller”:
Amazon did not hold title to the product sold here, did not set the
price of the product, and did not create the text describing or making
representations about the product. Amazon’s role in the transaction
was to provide a mechanism to facilitate the interchange between the
entity seeking to sell the product and the individual who sought to
buy it.82

As in Erie Insurance Company v. Amazon.com, Inc.,83 the Fox district court supported its decision with the later-vacated district court
holding of Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc.84 that Amazon was not a
“seller” under Pennsylvania law.85 Finally, the Fox district court concluded that Amazon had no duty to warn the plaintiff about the
77. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-106 (1978).
78. Fox, 2018 WL 2431628, at *6.
79. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102(7) (“ ‘ Seller’ also includes a lessor or bailor engaged
in the business of leasing or bailment of a product.”).
80. See Fox, 2018 WL 2431628, at *6.
81. See id. The plaintiff also argued Amazon was “ ‘ an entity engaged in the business of
selling a product.’ ” Id.
82. Id. at *7; accord Stiner v. Amazon.com, Inc., 120 N.E.3d 885, 895 (Ohio Ct. App.
2019), motion for reconsideration granted, 129 N.E.3d 461 (Ohio Sup. Ct. 2019).
83. 925 F.3d at 144; see also supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
84. 295 F. Supp. 3d at 496.
85. 930 F.3d 136, 153 (3rd Cir. 2019), reh’g on banc granted, opinion vacated, 936 F.3d
182 (3rd Cir. 2019). The Fox court also cited McDonald v. LG Elecs, USA, Inc., 219 F. Supp.
3d 533 (D. Md. 2016), in support of its conclusion that Amazon was not a seller. See Fox,
2018 WL 2431628, at *8; see also supra notes 49–54 and accompanying text.
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hoverboard hazards since it was neither the seller nor the manufacturer,
but merely a facilitator of the hoverboard’s sale.86
On appeal,87 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals broadened the definition of “seller” under the TPLA beyond just whether title had transferred. 88 The appeals court found persuasive and adopted the plaintiff’s
argument that the definition of “seller” should encompass “any individual or entity regularly engaged in exercising sufficient control over a
product in connection with its sale, lease, or bailment, for livelihood or
gain.”89 In particular, the court believed this definition was consistent
with the remedial purpose of the TPLA: “A primary purpose of [the
TPLA] is to ensure that an injured consumer may maintain a strict liability action against whomever is most likely to compensate him for his
injuries.”90 However, in applying the facts to the case, the appeals court
concluded that Amazon did not exercise sufficient control over the
hoverboard to be deemed a “seller” under the TPLA: Amazon “did not
choose to offer the hoverboard for sale, did not set the price of the hoverboard, and did not make any representations about the safety or specifications of the hoverboard on its marketplace.”91
86. See Fox, 2018 WL 2431628, at *10. The Fox district court also ruled against the
plaintiff’s claim under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, concluding the plaintiff had
not demonstrated any losses as a result of unfair or deceptive practices by Amazon. See id. at
*14.
87. Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., 930 F.3d 415 (6th Cir. 2019).
88. In particular, the court noted that the TPLA’s definition of “ ‘ seller’ expressly includes a ‘lessor’ and a ‘bailor,’ neither of which necessarily transfers title to the products they
lease or bail.” Id. at 423; see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102(7) (1978).
89. Fox, 930 F.3d at 423. The Fox appeals court also cited cases that considered or
adopted constructions of “seller” that “hinge on the degree of control exercised over a product.” Id. at 425 (citing Erie Ins. Co., 925 F.3d at 139; Garber v. Amazon.com, Inc., 380 F.
Supp. 3d 766, 776–77 (N.D. Ill. 2019); Carpenter v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-03221-JST,
2019 WL 1259158, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2019); Eberhart, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 398–99;
Allstate N.J. Ins. Co., 2018 WL 3546197, at *7–10; Oberdorf, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 498; Stiner,
120 N.E.3d at 895).
90. Id. at 424 (citing Owens v. Truckstops of Am., 915 S.W.2d 420, 432 (Tenn. 1996))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Id. at 425 (citing Garber, 380 F. Supp. 3d at 776–77, 780–81; Carpenter, 2019 WL
1259158, at *5; Stiner, 120 N.E.3d at 895); accord Allstate N.J. Ins. Co., 2018 WL 3546197,
at *12 (concluding policy argument of shifting the risk up the distribution chain cannot alone
transform Amazon into a “product seller”). While affirming the district court’s dismissal of
the plaintiff’s Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claim (see Fox, 930 F.3d at 428–29), the
appeals court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s negligent failure to warn
claim against Amazon: because the December 12, 2015 email did not inform hoverboard purchasers of any of the actions Amazon had taken to evaluate the dangers posed by hoverboard,
that the reported safety issues included a risk of fire or explosion, and that Amazon had ceased
all hoverboard sales worldwide, there was a genuine issue of fact whether the plaintiff would
have relied on those facts. See Fox, 930 F.3d at 426–28; cf., Love v. Weecoo (TM), 774 F.
App.x 519 (11th Cir. 2019) (reversing dismissal of plaintiff’s negligent failure to warn claim
against Amazon on basis that it could reasonably be inferred Amazon had constructive
knowledge of the potential risk of fire associated with hoverboard at issue at time of sale).
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B. Cases Finding Amazon May Be a “Seller”
In State Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. Amazon.com, Inc.,92
the District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin stated that the
case’s key dispute was whether Amazon qualified as a “seller” or “distributor” under Wisconsin’s products liability statute.93 Noting that Wisconsin’s statute specifies when sellers or distributors are not liable, rather than what entities are liable, the district court concluded the purpose
of the statute “was to limit when a plaintiff may target a nonmanufacturer
defendant, but not who may be held liable as a nonmanufacturer defendant.”94 Applying Wisconsin law, the district court also categorically rejected that a formal transfer of ownership is required to hold an entity
strictly liable for a defective product,95 accepting the principle that strict
liability derives from the act of putting the defective product into the
stream of commerce.96
Acknowledging that Wisconsin law does not impose liability if an
entity plays only a peripheral role in putting a defective article into the
stream of commerce, the district court focused on whether “Amazon [is]
a peripheral entity like an auctioneer or . . . an integral part of the chain
of distribution more akin to the lessor in Kemp[.]”97 The district court
concluded that Amazon was an integral part of the chain of distribution—“an entity well-positioned to allocate the risks of defective products to the participants in the chain.”98 The court then summarized the
facts supporting this conclusion:
Amazon provided the only conduit between XMJ, the Chinese
[third-party] seller, and the American marketplace. Without Amazon, XMJ products would not be available at all in Wisconsin. Amazon did not directly set the price for the faucet adapter, but it set the
substantial fees that it would retain for itself, so it was positioned to
insure against the risk of defective products. As part of the [Fulfillment by Amazon] agreement, Amazon required XMJ to register each
product, and Amazon reserved the right to refuse to sell any of them.
So Amazon was in a position to halt the flow of any defective goods
of which it became aware. And Amazon took steps to protect itself
by requiring XMJ to indemnify Amazon. Amazon also implicitly

92. 390 F. Supp. 3d 964 (W.D. Wis. 2019).
93. See id. at 969. Absent the satisfaction of certain conditions, in Wisconsin, “[a] seller
or distributor of a product is not liable based on a claim of strict liability to a claimant.” WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 895.047(2) (2011).
94. State Farm, 390 F. Supp. 3d at 970.
95. Id. at 972 (citing Kemp v. Miller, 453 N.W.2d 872, 879 (1990)).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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represented that the adapter was safe by listing it for sale among its
own products, and it expressly guaranteed timely delivery in good
condition. And, under Amazon’s A to Z guarantee, Amazon agreed
to process returns and refunds if XMJ did not respond. Amazon took
on all the roles of a traditional—and very powerful—reseller/distributor. The only thing Amazon did not do was take ownership of
XMJ’s goods.99

In December 2014, Heather Oberdorf purchased a retractable dog
leash from an Amazon third-party seller identified as “The Furry
Gang.”100 While walking her dog, using the leash on January 12, 2015,
“Oberdorf suffered severe and permanent injuries to her left eye when
the retractable leash malfunctioned, snapping backwards and hitting her
in the face.”101 “Following the accident, the plaintiffs” (Heather and Michael Oberdorf) were “unable to make contact with The Furry Gang or
with the manufacturer of the retractable leash,” but they did sue Amazon
for strict products liability under § 402A.102 The District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania immediately addressed the issue of
whether Amazon should be considered a “seller” under Pennsylvania’s
adoption of § 402A.103 Noting that “[t]he Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has not ruled on whether an online sales listing service like Amazon
Marketplace qualifies as a ‘seller’ under § 402A[,]”104 the court principally relied on a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case, Musser v. Vilsmeier
Auction Company, Inc.,105 which held an auctioneer was not a “seller”
under § 402A.106 Analogizing the Amazon Marketplace Service with a
newspaper’s classified advertisements (“connecting potential consumers
with eager sellers in an efficient, modern, streamlined manner”),107 the
district court concluded that subjecting Amazon to strict products liability would not further the purpose § 402A108—“i.e., the ‘special responsibility for the safety of the public undertaken by one who enters into the
business of supplying human beings with products which may endanger

99. Id.
100. Oberdorf, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 498.
101. Id. at 497.
102. Id. at 498–500.
103. See id. at 500-01 (“Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has defined ‘seller’
under § 402A expansively, it has not left that category boundless.” (citation omitted)).
104. Id. at 501.
105. 562 A.2d 279 (1989).
106. See Oberdorf, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 500–01; see also Musser, 562 A.2d at 376 (“[W]e
hold that auctioneers are not ‘sellers’ within the meaning of [§ 402A].”).
107. Oberdorf, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 501.
108. Id.
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the safety of their persons and property, and the forced reliance upon that
undertaking on the part of those who purchase such goods[.]’ ” 109
Although Amazon and the district court relied on Musser, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals actually used the analysis in Musser to reverse
the district court’s holding on strict liability.110 The appeals court focused on four factors articulated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
determining whether an actor is a “seller” under § 402A:
(1) Whether the actor is the “only member of the marketing chain
available to the injured plaintiff for redress”;
(2) Whether “imposition of strict liability upon the [actor] serves as
an incentive to safety”;
(3) Whether the actor is “in a better position than the consumer to
prevent the circulation of defective products”; and
(4) Whether “[t]he [actor] can distribute the cost of compensating
for injuries resulting from defects by charging for it in his business, i.e.,
by adjustment of the rental terms.”111
The appeals court concluded that all four factors weigh in favor of
imposing strict liability on Amazon.112
Although Amazon argued every item sold through its Marketplace
service could be traced to a third-party seller, the court noted that those
third-party sellers can communicate with purchasers only through Amazon, which enables them to conceal themselves from those purchasers.113
The appeals court also noted that Amazon has no vetting process to ensure that its third-party sellers are amenable to legal process.114 Finally,
the appeals court noted the other cases in which purchasers had been
injured by allegedly defective products sold by Amazon third-party
sellers who could not be located.115 The court believed that since Amazon exerts significant control over its third-party sellers (e.g., its unfettered right to suspend or terminate any third-party vendors or remove
their products at any time) it is therefore capable, in its sole discretion,
of removing unsafe products from its website, and imposing strict

109. Id. at 500 (quoting Musser, 562 A.2d at 281 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A cmt. f.)).
110. Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 930 F.3d 136, 143–44 (3rd Cir. 2019), opinion vacated, reh’g en banc granted, 936 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2019).
111. Id. at 144 (quoting Musser, 562 A.2d at 282).
112. Id. at 147–48.
113. Id. at 145.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 145 n.20 (citing Allstate N.J. Ins. Co., 2018 WL 3546197, at *2 (D.N.J. July
24, 2018); Fox v. Amazon.com, No. 16-cv-3013, 2018 WL 2431628, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. May
30, 2018); Stiner v. Amazon, 15-cv-185837 (Ohio. Com. Pl. Sept. 20, 2017) (Dkt. No. 1201), aff’d, 120 N.E.3d 885 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019)).
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liability would provide Amazon with an incentive to do so.116 The court
also believed Amazon was in a better position than the consumer to prevent the circulation of defective products because of its ongoing relationships with its third-party sellers.117 And it is through its own website
that Amazon can better collect information to identify defective products—particularly because “Amazon specifically curtails the channels
that third-party vendors may use to communicate with customers[.]”118
Finally, the court believed Amazon was better able to distribute the cost
of compensating for injuries resulting from defects because Amazon
could adjust the commission-based fees that it charges to third-party
sellers based on the risk sellers presented.119 The court concluded: “Amazon’s customers are particularly vulnerable in situations like the present
case. Neither the Oberdorfs nor Amazon has been able to locate the
third-party vendor, The Furry Gang. Conversely, had there been an incentive for Amazon to keep track of its third-party vendors, it might have
done so.”120
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals also rejected Amazon’s argument that it was not a “seller” subject to strict liability under § 402A
because it neither took nor transferred title to the product in question.121
The appeals court noted that a Pennsylvania Superior Court ruling had
determined that transfer of title was not required, and Pennsylvania’s
Supreme Court had not repudiated that decision.122 The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals’ Oberdorf decision was vacated pending rehearing by
the Third Circuit en banc.123 The rehearing was held February 19, 2020,
and oral argument was to be limited to whether Amazon is subject to
strict products liability claims as a “seller” under Pennsylvania law.124

116. Oberdorf, 930 F.3d at 146.
117. Id. 146–47.
118. Id. at 147.
119. See id.
120. Id. at 147.
121. Id. at 148 (citing Hoffman v. Loos & Dilworth, Inc., 452 A.2d 1349, 1354-55 (holding
that a participant in a sales process may be held strictly liable for a defective product, even
when the participant never took title nor possession of the product)).
122. See Oberdorf, 930 F.3d at 148.
123. Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 936 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2019).
124. Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 4-16-cv-01127 (3rd Cir. Dec. 3, 2019) (Dkt. No.
BL105) (order limiting scope of suit at February hearing). The Third Circuit panel reportedly
was inclined toward certifying the question of Amazon’s status as a seller to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. See Martina Barash, Amazon ‘Seller’ Issue May Get Punted to Pennsylvania
High Court, Bloomberg L. (Feb. 20, 2020, 4:03 PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/exp/eyJjdHh0IjoiTFdOVyIsImlkIjoiMDAwMDAxNzAtNjNkNC1kMjJlLWFkZjctNjNmZGVlZDIwMDAwIiwic2lnIjoid2NtNmRvY1htVG9JZmFENE9YUG5sbjRhV3FBPSIsInRpbWUiOiIxNTgyMzIwMDI0
IiwidXVpZCI6IkhvdDg2TXo5Y2xYWGsyUWFBYldCZVE9PW02ZkU3aXlBMURYMW
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Two early 2020 U.S. District Court cases have also indicated that
Amazon should be considered a “seller” vis-à-vis third-party sales
through its online Marketplace. In Legal Aid of Nebraska, Inc. v. Chaina
Wholesale, Inc.,125 the plaintiff brought negligence, strict failure to warn,
and UCC breach of warranties claims under Nebraska law after a space
heater, purchased from a third-party on Amazon’s Marketplace, caused
a fire.126 Without questioning whether Amazon was the actual “seller”
of the space heater, the District Court for the District of Nebraska denied
Amazon’s motion to dismiss on all counts (except an implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose claim).127
Gartner v. Amazon.com, Inc. involved the sale of a generic Apple
TV remote from a third-party seller through Amazon’s online Marketplace.128 The remote’s battery compartment opened, exposing a button
battery that was ingested by the plaintiff’s nineteen-month-old daughter,
resulting in serious injuries.129 As in most of the other third-party seller
strict products liability actions, Amazon claimed it was not subject to the
plaintiff’s claims because it was not the “seller” of the remote.130 Texas
has an innocent seller statute,131 but a non-manufacturer seller can still
be subject to a products liability action if the manufacture is not subject
to the jurisdiction of the court.132 The Texas statute then provides that
where a non-resident manufacturer fails to answer or otherwise make an
appearance on time, the manufacturer will be deemed “not subject to the
jurisdiction of the court unless the seller is able to secure personal jurisdiction over the manufacturer in the action.”133
Since Amazon claimed it was not, in fact, the “seller,” the court
turned to that issue. The court first noted that based on Texas’s courts’
interpretation, § 402A applies to any person engaged in the business of
selling a product for consumption, manufacturers, distributors, lessors,
bailors, and dealers.134 Amazon argued it was more like an auctioneer
that plays only an incidental role in a product’s placement in the stream
52MDlXSkNBanc9PSIsInYiOiIxIn0 (reporting also that plaintiffs’ counsel favored certification while Amazon’s counsel did not).
125. No. 4:19-CV-3103, 2020 WL 42471 (D. Neb. Jan. 3, 2020).
126. See id. at *1.
127. See id. at *2–5.
128. No. 4:18-CV-02242, slip op. at 1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2020) (order granting in part and
denying in part motion for summary judgment).
129. Id. at 2.
130. Id. at 5.
131. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.003 (West 2006); see also supra note 46
and accompanying text.
132. See id. § 82.003(a)(7)(B).
133. See id. § 82.003(c) (emphasis added).
134. Gartner, slip op. at 8.
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of commerce.135 The court, however, noted that Amazon, through its
Fulfillment by Amazon service, stored the remote, packaged and prepared it for delivery, and delivered it.136 While Amazon did not set the
remote’s price, it set the fees it retained from the sale of the remote and
it controls the process by which the customer pays for the product and
the third-party seller receives payment.137 Amazon retained the right to
withhold payments to the third-party seller and operated as the sole channel of communication between customers and third-party sellers.138 In
sum, according to the court, Amazon was “integrally involved in and
exert[ed] control over the sales of third-party products.”139
Once again, Amazon argued it was not a seller because it never took
title to the remote.140 The court noted, however, that “Texas law does
not require an entity to transfer title or sell a product to be considered a
seller.”141 Amazon also argued that it should not be considered a “seller”
for public policy reasons by asserting it had “no relationship with the
manufacturer, rendering it unable to directly pressure the manufacturer
on safety or spread the cost of defects across units sold.”142 The court
rejected this argument, noting that Amazon has the power to “halt the
placement of defective products in the stream of commerce, deterring
future injuries.”143 For these reasons, the District Court for the Southern
District of Texas concluded Amazon was a “seller” subject to Texas’s
innocent seller exception (meaning Amazon could be held liable if it is
unable to secure personal jurisdiction over the manufacturer).144
As discussed below and although outside the realm of strict products liability law, there are a few court decisions on what constitutes a
“seller” that could apply by analogy to Amazon’s status in relation to
third-party sales through its online Marketplace. For example, in determining that Amazon’s third-party sellers were not the actual “sellers” on
Amazon’s Marketplace for purposes of its state’s sales tax collection
laws, and that it was Amazon that was “engaged in the business of
135. Id. at 10.
136. Id. at 11.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. (emphasis added).
140. Gartner, slip op. at 14. See also Erie Ins. Co., 925 F.3d at 141; Fox, 2018 WL
2431628, at *6; but see Fox, 930 F.3d at 422; Oberdorf, 930 F.3d at 148.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 15. Furthermore, the court noted that Amazon required indemnification from
third-party sellers for any strict products liability. See id.
144. Id.; see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.003 (West 2006) (“[T]he
manufacturer is not subject to the jurisdiction of the court unless the seller is able to secure
personal jurisdiction over the manufacturer in the action.”).
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selling,” the South Carolina Department of Revenue noted identical factors discussed in products liability cases, namely:
(1) a purchase is often completed through Amazon Services’ website
without any interaction between the customer and the [third-party]
other than a product description (possibly) written by the [thirdparty]; (2) the [third-party] is prohibited from accepting payment
from the customer; (3) Amazon Services sends the order confirmation to the customer; (4) Amazon Services notifies the customers
when an order has been received or shipped; and (5) Amazon is the
only party that provides a receipt for the products purchased.145

In general, indirect purchasers—i.e., those who purchase through a
middleman—cannot maintain an antitrust action.146 Apple raised this
defense against iPhone users who had purchased third-party apps
through Apple’s App Store, arguing that iPhone users are indirect purchasers because they purchased the apps—not from Apple—but from
the third-party app developers who set their own prices and used Apple
only as a medium.147 The Supreme Court rejected Apple’s argument that
its iPhone users were not direct purchasers merely because the thirdparty app developers set the price.148 Nor did it matter that Apple never
took title to the third-party apps: “Denying standing because ‘title’ never
passes to a broker is an overly lawyered approach that ignores the reality
that a distribution system that relies on brokerage is economically indistinguishable from one that relies on purchaser-resellers.”149 Ultimately,
the Supreme Court refused to elevate form (the precise arrangement between manufacturers or suppliers and retailers) over substance (e.g., is
the consumer harmed because of Amazon’s actions?).150
C. Immunity Under the Communications Decency Act
Because Amazon operates through a website, it has, in some cases,
raised a defense of immunity to liability for defective products under the

145. Amazon Services, LLC v. S.C. Dep’t of Rev., Docket No. 17-ALJ-17-0238-CC, slip
op. at 46 (Sept. 10, 2019), https://src.bna.com/LXJ.
146. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 731-36 (1977) (rejecting the defense
that indirect purchasers, as opposed to direct purchasers, were the injured parties of an alleged
antitrust violation).
147. See Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1518-19 (2019).
148. See id. at 1521–24.
149. Id. at 1523 (2019) (applying Clayton Act) (quoting 2A P. Areeda, H. Hovenkamp,
R. Blair, & C. Durrance, Antitrust Law ¶ 345, at 183 (2014)).
150. See id. (specifically identifying the “substance” question as whether “the consumer
paying a higher price because of the monopolistic retailer’s actions”).
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Communications Decency Act (CDA).151 Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA
provides, “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider.”152 Since the sales in question are
made by third-party sellers, Amazon claims that it is immune from liability for any information those third-party sellers posted on Amazon’s
website regarding their products.153
Section 230 “creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that
would make service providers liable for information originating with a
third-party user of the service.”154 As a result, “lawsuits seeking to hold
a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred.”155 Courts use a three-part test to determine whether a party is immune under § 230: “1) whether Defendant
is a provider of an interactive computer service; 2) if the postings at issue
are information provided by another information content provider; and
3) whether Plaintiffs [sic] claims seek to treat Defendant as a publisher
or speaker of third party content.”156 Generally, there is no question that
Amazon operates an interactive computer service, or that information
related to the product in question was posted by a third party.157
However, the courts that have addressed this issue have distinguished Amazon’s liability for its own tortious conduct, such as negligence or breach of implied warranty, from its liability as a publisher of
information under a theory of failure to warn.158 But where a court has
151. See infra Appendix (summarizing recent products liability claims actions against
Amazon and its CDA -defense); see also Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. V, § 509, 110 Stat. 56, 137–
39 (1996) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2016)).
152. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
153. See, e.g., McDonald v. LG Electronics USA, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 533, 536 (D. Md.
2016).
154. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
155. Id.
156. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 564 F.Supp.2d 544, 548 (E.D.
Va. 2008), aff’d, 591 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 2009).
157. See McDonald, 219 F. Supp. 3d. at 537.
158. See id. at 538; Erie Ins. Co., 925 F.3d at 139–40 (“While the Communications Decency Act protects interactive computer service providers from liability as a publisher of
speech, it does not protect them from liability as the seller of a defective product.”) (emphasis
in original); Oberdorf, 930 F.3d at 153 (“[T]o the extent that [the plaintiff]’s negligence and
strict liability claims rely on Amazon’s role as an actor in the sales process, they are not barred
by the CDA. However, . . . failure to warn claims are barred by the CDA.”); Order, Gartner,
No. 4:18-cv-02242, at 17 (“Insofar as Plaintiff’s claims might relate to Amazon’s editorial
control over the product detail page and failure to provide adequate warning on the page, those
claims would be barred by the CDA . . . . As to Plaintiff’s claims that relate only to Amazon’s
involvement in the sales process of third-party products, the CDA does not apply . . . .”); State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 390 F. Supp. 3d at 973–74 (“Amazon’s active participation in the
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determined Amazon is not a “seller,” it will most likely consider Amazon’s CDA defense moot.159
V. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR HOLDING AMAZON
STRICTLY LIABLE AS A “SELLER”
Over the past 100 years, courts and state legislatures have eliminated the privity of contract requirement to allow consumers injured by
defective products to hold liable any party in the chain of distribution.160
The underlying public policy has been that actors who place defective
products into the stream of commerce should be liable to innocent purchasers and users for damages and injuries suffered as a result of the
defect. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability explains
the rationale for holding non-manufacturer sellers strictly liable for defective products they place in the stream of commerce:
An often-cited rationale for holding wholesalers and retailers strictly
liable for harm caused by manufacturing defects is that, as between
them and innocent victims who suffer harm because of defective
products, the product sellers as business entities are in a better position than are individual users and consumers to insure against such
losses. In most instances, wholesalers and retailers will be able to
pass liability costs up the chain of product distribution to the manufacturer. When joining the manufacturer in the tort action presents
the plaintiff with procedural difficulties, local retailers can pay damages to the victims and then seek indemnity from manufacturers. Finally, holding retailers and wholesalers strictly liable creates incentives for them to deal only with reputable, financially responsible
manufacturers and distributors, thereby helping to protect the interests of users and consumers.161

One exception to this elimination of privity has been to hold harmless “innocent” sellers who merely pass along products without modifying them, affecting their packaging, or knowing of any defect.162 But
even that exception has its own exception—many courts and state
sale, through payment processing, storage, shipping, and customer service, is what makes it
strictly liable. This is not activity immunized by the CDA.”).
159. See, e.g., Fox, 930 F.3d at 425 n.6; Allstate N.J. Ins. Co., 2018 WL 3546197, at *12
n.9; Carpenter, 2019 WL 1259158, at *3; Garber, 380 F. Supp. 3d at 782; Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-CV-03115 (DRH)(AKT), 2019 WL 6525624,
at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2019).
160. See Steven Bonanno, Privity, Products Liability, and UCC Warranties: A Retrospect
of and Prospects for Illinois Commercial Code 2-318, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 177, 178–90
(1991).
161. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST .
1998).
162. See supra Part III.
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statutes will still hold an innocent seller liable if the manufacturer of the
defective product is insolvent, cannot be identified, or is not subject to
service in the applicable court.163
In many of the products liability lawsuits recently filed against Amazon, this exception to the exception would most likely apply—the manufacturers of the defective products at issue simply cannot be identified,
found, or subjected to the court’s jurisdiction. In these cases, though,
Amazon has argued this is all irrelevant, since it is not even a “seller” of
the product in question. It argues it merely served as a conduit between
the consumer and the entity that actually sold the product to the consumer. The public policy question is whether Amazon should be allowed to serve as a conduit to place defective products into the stream
of commerce without any responsibility for the injuries and damages
caused by those products.
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Oberdorf pointed out, public policy would be best served by imposing liability on Amazon in the
following instances: (1) it is the “only member of the marketing chain
available to the injured plaintiff for redress”; (2) holding it liable would
“serve as an incentive to safety”; (3) Amazon is “in a better position than
the consumer to prevent the circulation of defective products”; and (4)
Amazon “can distribute the cost of compensating for injuries resulting
from defects by charging for it in its business,” i.e., by adjusting its terms
of sales.164 All four of these public policy arguments apply to Amazon
and many of its third-party sales.165
In 2018, third-party sales on Amazon’s Marketplace were $160 billion,166 generating close to $50 billion in annual revenue for Amazon.167
Amazon itself acknowledges that it faces potential liabilities for the
products sold through third parties.168 And while Amazon may not take
163. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 33 and 44; note 46.
164. See Oberdorf, 930 F.3d at 144 (quoting Musser, 562 A.2d at 282). But see Eric Goldman, Opinion, Should Amazon Be Responsible When Its Vendors’ Products Turn Out to Be
Unsafe? Critics of Amazon Say Legal Precedents Justify Holding the Company Liable for
Third-Party Sellers’ Products. Others Say Amazon’s Scale Makes It Unfeasible to Do So,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/should-amazon-be-responsiblewhen-its-vendors-products-turn-out-to-be-unsafe-11582898971.
165. See id. at 147–48 (“[A]lthough the four-factor test yielded a different result when
applied by the Musser court to an auction house, all four factors in this case weigh in favor of
imposing strict liability on Amazon.”).
166. See Amazon 2018 Annual Report, supra note 2, at *2 (Jeffrey P. Bezos Letter to
Shareholders).
167. See, e.g., News Release, Amazon, Amazon.com Announces Third Quarter Sales up
24% to $70.0 Billion (Oct. 24, 2019, 4:01 PM), https://ir.aboutamazon.com/news-releases/news-release-details/amazoncom-announces-third-quarter-sales-24-700-billion (summing revenues for third-party seller services for Q4 2018 through Q3 2019).
168. See Amazon 2018 Annual Report, supra note 2.
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or transfer title, as the District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin concluded, Amazon takes on “all the roles of a traditional—and very
powerful—reseller/distributor.”169 Though arguing with respect to CDA
immunity, Benjamin Edelman’s and Abbey Stemler’s conclusion applies
equally to strict products liability: “[U]ntouchable intermediaries not
only facilitate bad behavior but also are likely to disproportionately hurt
those most vulnerable.”170 Meanwhile, as third-party sales through its
online Marketplace have grown, there are indications Amazon is losing
control of not only who is selling on its website, but also the quality of
the products sold.171 Perhaps if Amazon had an incentive—in the form
of potential strict products liability—to keep better track of its thirdparty vendors, it might do so.172
Amazon has been primarily successful in avoiding strict products
liability claims for third party sales by arguing it is not actually a “seller.”
Since most state products liability statutes do not define seller,173 this has
left—primarily federal—courts to fashion their own interpretation (often
of what the state courts would conclude).174 Ideally, states should adopt
a formal definition of “seller” for strict products liability purposes, and
arguably a very broad one. Georgia has done just that:
[T]he term “product seller” means a person who, in the course of a
business conducted for the purpose leases or sells and distributes;

169. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 390 F. Supp. 3d at 972.
170. Benjamin Edelman & Abbey Stemler, From the Digital to the Physical: Federal
Limitations on Regulating Online Marketplaces, 56 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 141, 197 (2019).
171. See Safdar et al., supra note 17; Berzon et al., supra note 9 and accompanying text.
172. See Oberdorf, 930 F.3d at 146 (finding in favor of imposing strict liability on Amazon, in part, because it “is fully capable . . . of removing unsafe products from its website”
and “[i]mposing strict liability upon Amazon would be an incentive to do so”).
173. See James H. Rotondo, Jennifer L. Shukla, and Julia M. Sorenson, INSIGHT: Amazon Tests Boundaries of What It Means to Be a Product Seller, BLOOMBERG LAW (Oct. 17,
2018),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/product-liability-and-toxics-law/insight-amazontests-boundaries-of-what-it-means-to-be-a-product-seller (exploring the ways that various
courts have used definitions of “seller” with respect to Amazon); but see ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-681(9) (1978); COLO. REV. STAT. Ann. § 13-21-401(3) (West 2003); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 18, § 7001(a)(4) (West 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11.1(a) (West 1987); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99B-1(4) (West 1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.71(15)(a) (West
2001); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.001(3) (West 2006); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 7.72.010(1) (West 1991).
174. Procedurally, this can raise a barrier for plaintiffs. While clearly recognizing that
Maryland’s highest court may conclude Amazon is a “seller” for public policy reasons, Judge
Motz of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that federal courts sitting in diversity
“must proceed with caution.” Erie Ins. Co., 925 F.3d at 145 (Motz, J. concurring). Judge Motz
declined to predict whether Maryland courts would treat Amazon as a seller under state law
“[g]iven the policy-intensive nature of this inquiry, the lack of on-point Maryland precedent,
and Amazon’s novel business model.” Id. (noting “Amazon’s strategy of removing nearly
every products liability case to federal court has complicated this endeavor and arguably
stunted the development of state law”).
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installs; prepares; blends; packages; labels; markets; or assembles
pursuant to a manufacturer’s plan, intention, design, specifications,
or formulation; or repairs; maintains; or otherwise is involved in
placing a product in the stream of commerce.175

State products liability statutes could then include partial innocent
seller defenses to liability unless the following exceptions apply: (1) the
seller exercised some significant control over the design or manufacture
of the product, or provided instructions or warnings to the manufacturer
relative to the alleged defect in the product which caused the injury,
death or damage; (2) the seller had actual knowledge of the defect; (3)
the seller is a controlled subsidiary of a manufacturer, or the manufacturer is a controlled subsidiary of the seller; (4) the seller created the
defect or provided the plans or specifications for the manufacture or
preparation of the product and such plans or specifications were a proximate cause of the defect; or (5) the defect was the result of the seller’
negligence or the breach of an express warranty made by the seller. In
particular, the innocent seller defense would not apply in these situations: (1) the manufacturer no longer exists, cannot be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state, or, despite due diligence, the manufacturer is not amenable to service of process; (2) the manufacturer is
unable to satisfy any judgment as determined by the court; or (3) the
court determines that the manufacturer would be unable to satisfy a reasonable settlement or other agreement with the plaintiff.
This approach would satisfy the public policy justifications for
strict products liability expressed in Restatement (Third) Torts: Products
Liability: Amazon is in a better position, relative to an innocent purchaser, to insure against losses; Amazon can always seek indemnity
from the manufacturer; and this approach can incentivize Amazon to allow only reputable and financially responsible third parties to sell products through its marketplace platform.176
VI. CONCLUSION
When courts were first presented with the issue of whether Amazon was a “seller” in third-party sales transactions, they relied on very
thin precedent to conclude Amazon was not a “seller” (principally because it never took nor transferred title) and therefore had no liability
for the defective product purchased (usually under an Amazon Prime
membership and shipped by Amazon).177 Courts and legislatures need
175. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11.1(A) (emphasis added).
176. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2, cmt. a (AM. LAW
INST. 1998), supra note 161 and accompanying text.
177. See, e.g., supra notes 62–67 and accompanying text.
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to recognize Amazon has disrupted the supply chain: “By design, Amazon’s business model cuts out the middlemen between manufacturers
and consumers, reducing the friction that might keep foreign (or otherwise judgment-proof) manufacturers from putting dangerous products
on the market.”178 If courts were to instead examine the realities of the
transactions in question—Amazon’s control over third parties and involvement in the sales and delivery processes—and factor in public
policy considerations, they may reach a different conclusion: of the
millions of products Amazon sells to millions of households—in which
it is much more than peripherally involved—it should be liable for defective products it places into the stream of commerce.
Appendix
Summary of Amazon Marketplace Product Liability Cases
Case
McDonald v.
LG
Electronics
USA,
Inc.,
219 F. Supp.
3d 533 (D.
Md. 2016)

Product/Incident
Purchaser burned
by rechargeable
batteries

Law(s) Applied
Communications
Decency
Act
(“CDA”),
47
U.S.C.
§ 230;
MD. CODE ANN.,
COM. LAW §§ 2104(1), 2-314(1)

Hearing, Erie
Ins. Co. v.
Amazon.com,
Inc., No. 1602679-RWT,
2018
WL
3046243 (D.
Md. Jan. 22,
2018), aff’d in
part and rev’d
in part by 925
F3d 135 (4th
Cir. 2019)

Batteries
in
headlamp
malfunctioned,
causing house to
catch fire

Strict products
liability,
negligence,
breach
of
warranty;
Communications
Decency
Act
(“CDA”),
47
U.S.C. § 230

178. Erie Ins. Co., 925 F.3d at 144.

Conclusion
Amazon’s own
negligence
not
immune
under
CDA,
but
negligent failure
to warn claim is
barred by CDA;
Amazon not a
merchant under
Maryland UCC
Amazon not a
“seller”
for
purposes
of
product liability;
Amazon immune
from
liability
under CDA
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Case
Erie Ins. Co.
v.
Amazon.com,
Inc., 925 F.3d
135 (4th Cir.
2019)

Product/Incident
Batteries
in
headlamp
malfunctioned,
causing house to
catch fire

Law(s) Applied
RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF
TORTS § 402A
(adopted
by
Maryland); MD.
CODE
ANN.,
COM. LAW § 2403;
Communications
Decency
Act
(“CDA”),
47
U.S.C. § 230

Fox
v.
Amazon.com,
Inc.,
No.
3:16-cv03013, 2018
WL 2431628
(M.D. Tenn.
May
30,
2018), aff’d in
part and rev’d
in part by Fox
v.
Amazon.com,
Inc., 930 F.3d
415 (6th Cir.
2019)

Lithium-ion
battery
in
hoverboard started
fire in home

Tennessee
Products
Liability
Act
(“TPLA”),
TENN.
CODE
ANN. §§ 29-28101–108;
Tennessee
Consumer
Protection Act
(“TCPA”),
TENN.
CODE
ANN. §§ 47-18104,
109;
Communications
Decency
Act
(“CDA”),
47
U.S.C. § 230

281

Conclusion
Affirming—
Amazon not a
“seller”
for
purposes
of
product liability;
Reversing—
Amazon
not
immune
from
liability
under
CDA as a seller of
defective
products (but still
protected from
liability as a
publisher
of
speech)
Amazon not a
“seller”
under
TPLA because it
did not hold or
transfer title to
the product; since
claims dismissed
against Amazon,
no
need
to
consider
CDA
defense
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Case
Fox
v.
Amazon,
930 F.3d 415
(6th
Cir.
2019)

Product/Incident
Lithium-ion
battery
in
hoverboard started
fire in home

Allstate N.J.
Ins. Co. v.
Amazon.com,
Inc., No. 172738 (FLW)
(LHG), 2018
WL 3546197
(D.N.J. July
24, 2018)

Laptop computer
replacement
battery started fire
in home

Law(s) Applied
Tennessee
Products
Liability
Act
(“TPLA”),
TENN.
CODE
ANN. §§ 29-28101–108;
RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF
TORTS §§ 323,
324A;
Tennessee
Consumer
Protection Act
(“TCPA”),
TENN.
CODE
ANN. § 47-18104
New
Jersey
Products
Liability
Act
(“PLA”),
N.J.
STAT.
ANN.
§§ 2A:58C-1–
11;
Communications
Decency
Act
(“CDA”),
47
U.S.C. § 230

[Vol:60
Conclusion
Amazon did not
exercise
sufficient control
over hoverboard
to be deemed a
“seller” of the
hoverboard under
the
TPLA;
genuine issue of
fact
whether
Amazon
breached duty to
warn
of
hoverboard’s
dangers

Although
Amazon
may
have technically
been a part of the
chain
of
distribution,
it
never exercised
control over the
product sufficient
to make it a
“product seller”
under the PLA;
transfer of title
irrelevant; since
claims dismissed
against Amazon,
no
need
to
consider
CDA
defense
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Case
Eberhart v.
Amazon.com,
Inc., 325 F.
Supp. 3d 393
(S.D.N.Y.
2018)

Product/Incident
Glass French press
coffee
maker
shattered,
lacerating thumb

Law(s) Applied
New York strict
product liability;
RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)
OF
TORTS: PROD.
LIAB.
§ 1;
negligence;
breach
of
warranty

Stiner
v.
Amazon.com,
Inc.,
120
N.E.3d 885
(Ohio
Ct.
App. 2019)

Death
from
caffeine toxicity

Ohio Products
Liability
Act,
OHIO REV. CODE
ANN.
§§ 2307.71–.80

283

Conclusion
Amazon,
an
“online
marketplace,” not
a “seller” or
distributor—
under
Restatement
(Third),
distributor must,
at some point,
own the defective
product; Amazon
made
no
statement about
coffee maker
Amazon not a
supplier
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Case
Carpenter v.
Amazon.com,
Inc., No. 17cv-03221JST,
2019
WL 1259158
(N.D.
Cal.
Mar.
19,
2019), appeal
filed,
Carpenter v.
Amazon.com,
Inc., No. 1915695, (9th
Cir. Jan. 30,
2020) (Dkt.
Nos. 32-33)

Product/Incident
House
burned
down a few weeks
after hoverboard
delivered

Law(s) Applied
California strict
product liability;
negligence;
failure to warn;
breach
of
implied
warranty;
Communications
Decency
Act
(“CDA”),
47
U.S.C. § 230

Garber
v.
Amazon.com,
Inc., 380 F.
Supp. 3d 766
(N.D.
Ill.
2019)

Hoverboard
spontaneously
self-ignited
and
started a fire that
caused extensive
damage to a home

RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF
TORTS § 402A
(adopted
by
Illinois); product
liability;
negligence;
Communications
Decency
Act
(“CDA”),
47
U.S.C. § 230
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Conclusion
Amazon
not
strictly
liable
because its role
was not integral
to the business
enterprise
(hoverboards)
and a necessary
factor in bringing
the product to
market; Amazon
had no duty to
protect
consumers from
defective
products; since
claims dismissed
against Amazon,
no
need
to
consider
CDA
defense
No strict liability
for Amazon since
it is a marketplace
provider, not a
“seller,” outside
of the distributive
chain; Amazon
had no duty to
warn;
since
claims dismissed
against Amazon,
no
need
to
consider
CDA
defense
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Case
Oberdorf v.
Amazon.com,
Inc., 295 F.
Supp. 3d 496
(M.D.
Pa.
2017), aff’d in
part
and
vacated
in
part
by
Oberdorf v.
Amazon.com,
Inc., 930 F.3d
136 (3d Cir.
2019)
Oberdorf v.
Amazon.com,
Inc., 930 F.3d
136 (3d Cir.
2019),
vacated
pending reh’g
en banc in
Oberdorf v.
Amazon.com,
Inc., 936 F.3d
182 (3d Cir.
2019)

Product/Incident
Retractable
dog
leash
malfunctioned
causing permanent
eye injury

Law(s) Applied
RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF
TORTS § 402A
(adopted
by
Pennsylvania);
Communications
Decency
Act
(“CDA”),
47
U.S.C. § 230

Conclusion
Amazon not a
“seller”
for
purposes of §
402A; CDA bars
claims
of
negligent
misrepresentation
based
on
information
provided by thirdparty seller

Retractable
dog
leash
malfunctioned
causing permanent
eye injury

RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF
TORTS § 402A
(adopted
by
Pennsylvania);
Communications
Decency
Act
(“CDA”),
47
U.S.C. § 230

State Farm v.
Amazon.com,
Inc., 390 F.
Supp. 3d 964
(W.D. Wis.
2019)

Bathtub
faucet
adaptor purchased
from
Amazon
third-party seller
malfunctioned,
damaging
purchaser’s home

WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 895.047;
Communications
Decency
Act
(“CDA”),
47
U.S.C. § 230

Public
policy
considerations
compel holding
Amazon
potentially liable
for participation
in
chain
of
distribution
(vacated pending
rehearing); CDA
protects Amazon
from claims for
failure to warn,
but not in role as
seller
of
a
defective product
Amazon critical
part
of
distribution
chain; transfer of
title
not
necessary;
Amazon
not
immune
under
CDA
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Case
Paptaros v.
Amazon.com,
Inc.,
2019
WL
4011502
(D.N.J. Aug.
26,
2019),
stayed
by
Papataros v.
Amazon.com,
Inc.,
No.
2:17-cv-9836
(KM)
(MAH), 2019
WL 4740669
(D.N.J. Sept.
3, 2019)
State
Farm
Fire & Cas.
Co.
v.
Amazon.com,
Inc., 407 F.
Supp. 3d 848
(D.
Ariz.
2019)

Product/Incident
Plaintiff injured by
allegedly defective
scooter

Law(s) Applied
New
Jersey
Products
Liability
Act
(“PLA”),
N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§
2A:58C-1–11;
Communications
Decency
Act
(“CDA”),
47
U.S.C. § 230

Conclusion
Relying
on
Oberdorf,
Amazon’s control
of product weighs
in
favor
of
finding Amazon a
“seller”;
plaintiff’s claims
for
Amazon’s
failure to provide
or edit adequate
warnings
are
barred by CDA
(stayed pending
Oberdorf)

Hoverboards
purchased
from
Amazon
thirdparty seller burst
into flame and
ignited fire in
insureds’ home

RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF
TORTS § 402A;
negligence

Philadelphia
Indemnity
Ins. Co. v.
Amazon.com,
Inc., No. 17cv-03155
(DRH)
(AKT), 2019
WL 6525624
(E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 4, 2019)

Defective blender
allegedly caused
fire in restaurant
where it was used

New York strict
products
liability;
negligence;
breach
of
warranty;
Communications
Decency
Act
(“CDA”),
47
U.S.C. § 230

Amazon
not
strictly
liable
because it did not
participate
significantly in
hoverboard’s
stream
of
commerce;
Amazon
not
negligently liable
Amazon not a
“seller” based on
Eberhart; since
claims dismissed
against Amazon,
no
need
to
consider
CDA
defense
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Case
State
Farm
Fire & Cas.
Co.
v.
Amazon.com,
Inc., 414 F.
Supp. 3d 870
(N.D. Miss.
2019)
Legal Aid of
Nebraska,
Inc. v. Chaina
Wholesale,
Inc., 4:19-cv3103, 2020
WL
42471
(D. Neb. Jan.
3, 2020)

Product/Incident
Hoverboards
purchased
from
Amazon
thirdparty seller burst
into flame and
ignited fire in
insureds’ home

Order
Granting in
Part
and
Denying in
Part Mot. for
Sum.
J.,
Gartner
v.
Amazon.com,
Inc.,
No.
4:18-cv02242 (S.D.
Tex. Jan. 7,
2020) (Dkt.
No. 60)

Generic Apple TV
remote’s battery
compartment
opened, exposing a
button battery that
was ingested by
the plaintiff’s 19month-old
daughter, resulting
in serious injuries

Defective quartz
space
heater
caused fire in
plaintiff’s office

Law(s) Applied
Mississippi
Products
Liability
Act
(“MPLA”),
MISS.
CODE
ANN. § 11-1-63;
negligence;
failure to warn
Nebraska
common
law
negligence; strict
liability failure
to warn; breach
of warranty

RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF
TORTS § 402A;
TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE
§ 82.001;
negligence;
breach
of
implied
warranty;
Communications
Decency
Act
(“CDA”),
47
U.S.C. § 230
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Conclusion
Amazon is a
marketplace
facilitator subject
to negligence and
negligent failure
to warn claims for
defective
hoverboard
Denied
Amazon’s motion
to dismiss (except
as to implied
warranty
of
fitness for a
particular
purpose claim);
no discussion of
whether Amazon
was the “seller”
Amazon is a
“seller” because it
is
integrally
involved in and
exerts
control
over the sales of
third-party
products; CDA
applies only to
editorial content
on
Amazon’s
website

